The Tyler Cowen

1. A look back at Foreign Policy's art this year, for which the magazine has been nominated twice by the National Magazine Awards. 
2. North Korean rice prices jump after the shelling of Yeongpyeong. With currency pegged, economic reactions to world events play out elsewhere. Thanks to the North Korean Economy Watch.
3. The evolving state of artificial intelligence. It wasn't until we abandoned our attempts to mimic human logic that artificial intelligence started to really take off. Via The Browser. 
4. After successfully flexing its muscle, a softer South Korea now appears open to more dialogue with the North and is expressing concern about the rights of North Korean citizens. 
5. Wonderful subway-map inspired understanding of capitalism and misery via Cool Infographics.

Deterrence

Edward Luttwak has an article praising the South Korean military for taking a harder line on the North. While hindsight is perhaps 20/20, he does (somewhat indirectly) make a good point regarding the complicity in which third parties empower the image of the DPRK.

Snapshots from Seoul

More juicy details of living with threats hanging over our heads:

• "I'm going to scurry my ass off. That's what they do in the movies right? Shit jumps off and all you see are people scurrying? That'll be me."
• "Yesterday I woke up when some people were drilling in my basement. I thought the shelling had started. It sounded like those aliens from that Tom Cruise movie, War of the Worlds. Everything was shaking. I decided to try and fall asleep again as quickly as possible. Path of least resistance."
• "I'm going to have three quick shots of whiskey to numb the fear. It might dampen my intelligence but at least I wont be paralyzed."
• "Should I just cut my losses and send money home now or try and ride out the storm, hoping the exchange rate will turn around?"
• "What do I do if I'm in the middle of a class? Herd those little shin-biters all down to the basement? The parking garage? You'd think we would have even a modicum of training for such eventualities."

Good times. 

Life During (Almost?) Wartime

Somewhere roughly 125 miles to the west of me, South Korean shells are presumably (hopefully) plunking harmlessly into the water. And, as always, the sensation of being caught between what I read on CNN and what I see around me is difficult to reconcile. Two large cranes operate just outside my window, constructing a new building as Seoul continues to march further down the path of development. Across the street, students bundled in parkas against the cold rush into a Gimbap Chungook (think traditional Korean McDonald's) for an early dinner before their hogwan starts. Buses filled with people lumber through the all-too-narrow streets and everything crackles with activity.

It is amazing to think of the difference between South and North Korea. Conceptually we all understand the great disparity in standard of living but it's different to really feel it. Put yourself in the shoes of a North Korean for a moment and look again at the scene. The new construction, free of any government planning or party oversight, cropping up organically. The students, unique yet uniform in their stylized self-expression, entering a restaurant overflowing with food and patrons, with ten similar establishments within a two minute walk in any direction. This very building, 8 stories tall with no less than four individual hogwans in it, all doing brisk business. And the streets, a constant stream of traffic, rushing hither and fro, each with unknowable purpose.

It is an overwhelming sensation, an impossibly complex tableau of activity. How can there be so many cars? How can there be so many stores and restaurants? How can organic creation produce such order? The inability of our minds to fully grasp the details of a thriving capitalist system is reason number one why centrally planned economies cannot work. And the very idea that this scene might be threatened by a few errant shells 125 miles to the west is equally confounding. One cannot imagine such a scene from scratch but, now it is laid out before us, one cannot imagine it stopping. Perhaps all it will take to free North Koreans from their indoctrination is an afternoon stroll through Seoul.

The Tyler Cowen

• Fascinating interview with the only surviving North Korean assassin from 1968's failed attempt on then-president Park Chung-Hee. This culture's capacity for forgiveness is truly awe-inspiring. While the story isn't a fairy-tale, the redemption of a man who, in most any other society, would have been locked away for a long time, is beautiful. Unsurprisingly, he falls far on the hawkish side of the spectrum with regards to current South Korean foreign policy against the North. 
• The first page of Foreign Policy's 'This Week at War' is on the prospects of a North-South war. In the style of these articles, it is terse and to the point, painting a bleak picture of the next few months. They seem to believe that status quo is unsustainable after the shelling of Yeongpyeong: either North Korea will recognize the hard-line and avoid further provocation or things will escalate quickly.

That's all for today. I'm heading out on the town to try and enjoy life lest is be snuffed from me unexpectedly. 

The Ship Has Sailed

Well we've hit Friday and I'm still alive (apparently). No reign of fire has smote me yet. A hedonistic last Saturday (all excited but don't know why Prince? maybe its cuz we're all going to die) notwithstanding, everything feels pretty par for the course right now. Koreans are angry at the military for not responding harshly enough (today's Korea Herald has a front page splash showing a satellite image of how badly South Korean shells missed their targets)* but it's a tired sort of frustration. Everyone knows the score. Everyone knows how limited the military options are and no one wants war.

No one, that is, except for my 13 year old students. Still swaddled in their warm psychological blanket of invulnerability, they see the reign of fire as the ultimate snow day. But the joint-military exercises ended Wednesday without much fanfare. Not to knock the Talking Heads, but Life During Wartime here is not exactly as advertised.

But just I'm getting used to it, more gut checks! More inflammatory reports! North Korea has promised to attack before the end of the year? Lusia (her spelling) claims that it will all go to pieces on December 15th? South Korea has committed to a full-scale aerial assault in response to any further North Korean violence? And...and...

And I begin to gain a deeper understanding of what it's like to be a South Korean. News media anywhere in the world make their money by appealing to our attention and what is more attention-grabbing than fear? The difference between South Korea and America is that there is, conceptually, a lot to be scared about over here. In America, soccer moms cluck over bad news abroad and lament the decline of their civilization however it may be presenting itself in that day's headlines. In South Korea (at least in Seoul), everyone is constantly exposed to the very real threat of imminent destruction.

But humans are a basically happy species. (We all want to be happy at any rate, as evidenced by the great lengths, healthy and otherwise, we go to avoid negative human emotions.) A human simply cannot be scared 24/7. Fear can be a nice diversion when it breaks us out of our mundane routines (the ultimate snow day feeling still has its hooks deep within our hearts) but it's not sustainable in the long-term.

When I was here in 2006, I was shocked at how calmly the layman took the news of a North Korean nuclear test. While the media played to my worst fears, my coworkers and friends just met my questions with smiles. At the time, I thought they were just pretending to be tough. It was the first time North Korea tested a nuke!

But now I understand that the threshold for fear, anger, and the host of other negative emotions that attend bad news was too high for the nuclear test. Your body adapts to your environment in an attempt to reach a normal human experience. Unless North Korea does something that physically impacts South Koreans, my friends and coworkers are not going to get too bent out of shape. And here I am, slowly understanding this coping mechanism on more than a purely cerebral level. Nice.


*It seems that the accompanying imagery has since been removed. I've tracked it to STRATFOR.com and then to the Digital Globe which I'm hoping will be viewable through this link in PDF form. The imagery in question is on page 12. 

Op-Ed: Strategic Diplomacy

A quick response to the post on Strategic Diplomacy while the getting's good.

I think the 'Aristotelian' assumptions about both China and North Korea are overly simplistic, digestible though they may be. Treating states as the primary actors in this area reduces a lot of potentially valuable analysis, particularly with regard to North Korea. The recently confirmed reports of Kim Jong-Un as heir apparent along with the various other changes to DPRK leadership make assumptions of cohesive leadership downright foolish.

I believe North Korea's recent aggression can be better understood when framed as part of internal jockeying by Jong-Un to establish credibility both among DPRK leadership and the international community. This is not to say that the strategic calculations with regard to China, South Korea, and the US as outlined in Strategic Diplomacy are inaccurate. However, it seems highly unlikely that this aggression has anything to do with sabre-rattling to get more aid. More realistic is the assumption that young Kim is trying to prove he's got the same balls as his father.

So what does this mean about the conclusions drawn in the Strategic Diplomacy post? Two things:

1. Holding joint-military exercises on Sunday might be more dangerous than imagined. If Jong-Un is attempting to show off his huevos, he's more likely to escalate the violence when presented with what the North is calling aggression.
2. China has less clout over the DPRK's actions and is therefore both more and less important a consideration. The US and South Korea should spend less time trying to convince China to pressure North Korea. However, China's strategic concerns over open war are still valid and, if they have less influence over the North than imagined, they might be more inclined to take a hard-line on policing any potential violence in their backyard.

All that being said, fear-mongering cries of insanity or illogic still have no place in this discussion. Kim Jong-Il has proved that he knows how far he can push the violence and, even if his son is flexing some muscle now, that's no reason to assume that the senior is totally out of the picture. The basic interests of all parties still align on a preference for uneasy truce, a foundation that will be important to keep in mind on Sunday.

Hard though it may be to stomach, North Korea's aggression must be mostly ignored. Unless confronted by inarguable facts to the contrary, US and South Korean forces should assume that any North Korean actions are isolated and do not represent a larger move toward open war. The existing rules of engagement are well-suited to defusing escalation and they should not be abandoned now.

Yes it sucks. Yes it's a really tough pill for anyone to swallow. But it's better than the alternative. If Seoul goes up in flames, the global economy takes it in the chin. If open war is declared, the two world superpowers inch dangerously close to WWIII. Bored nihilists might be okay with that, but everyone else with a stake in this era of human civilization should recognize that, if war is avoidable, it should be avoided at all costs.

CONTINGENCY PLANS:

A series of if...then... statements for lazy politicians looking for a shortcut:

• If North Korea lobs shells into the west sea, then the allies should ignore it. (REASON: No harm, no foul. If our joint-military exercises are firing into the waters off the North Korean coast, DPRK leadership needs to be given the flexibility to do the same.)
• If North Korea engages allied military vessels, then the allies should take all necessary steps against the immediate physical threat but not extend violence to more removed military targets. (REASON: The is in line with an established pattern of behavior that, while raising tensions, has not lead to outright war. Furthermore, even destructive patterns of behavior like this still constitute patterns which reduce uncertainty in the long-run.)
• If North Korea fires on non-vital South Korean soil, then the allies should return fire in kind. (REASON: Firing on sovereign soil is an important message but one that does not need to be met with an escalation to outright war.)
• If North Korea fires on vital South Korean soil, then the allies should assume a full-scale war is imminent and take out strategic military targets as quickly as possible. (REASON: This really needs little explanation. This is the threshold at which the allies should draw the line.)

The overall idea being as follows:

Since there is little actual communication with the DPRK leadership, alternative methods of communication are needed to reduce mutual uncertainty. Much as one trains a wild animal, repeated patterns of behavior can gradually establish norms which lead to better communication. As North Korea gets a little wilder with their leadership transition, this is precisely the approach that allies should take to tame this new beast.

Snapshots from Seoul

Having just finished a delicious meal of Sam Gyup Sal with a few close friends in Guri, a satellite of Seoul, I thought I would jot down a few notes from our conversation. Unsurprisingly, the conversation dealt heavily with the weighty matters of conflict in our yard.

• "Shit. I don't think I have my uniform anymore. How can I get drafted if I lost my uniform?"
• "Where's the first place you go if the call comes in that things have escalated? The embassy? The bar?"
• "Speaking of which, I left my passport in the office. I wouldn't even be able to get into my own embassy."
• "Imagine what it would feel like if you got a text message from me just being like, 'it started.' What would I even write? Would I write that? What about 'IT BEGINS!' Or maybe 'those assholes should have stayed out of the West Sea.'"
• "What will I wear? Should I take a shower?"

If the devil is in the details then the details are delicious.

Strategic Diplomacy

INTRODUCTION:

As the din rings round and round regarding the motivation for North Korea's attack on Yeongjyeong, I thought I would drop my two cents into the ocean for posterity's sake.

I believe that, when viewed from North Korea's perspective, the recent inflammation of relations is perfectly logical. I'll start by outlining the basic priorities of North Korea and China and then exploring how these priorities logically lead to the current type of diplomacy playing out on the peninsula. I'll then outline what I believe should be the reaction from the US and South Korean to the latest and any future hostilities.

ASSUMPTIONS:

Let's start with an Aristotelian assumption about North Korea: namely that it is working toward what it perceives as the greatest good for itself. Contrary to what the rest of the world is patiently waiting for, North Korea does not want to collapse. It wants to become a stronger player in international relations in order to bolster it's domestic prosperity. It is currently almost totally dependent on China for trade and basic materials and, as anyone knows, diversification is the best thing for a healthy portfolio. (For this most basic level of analysis, I feel comfortable using the state as the primary actor. The leadership of North Korea may have additional incentives for success such as prestige / wealth / whathaveyou but, in the face of knee-jerk cries of insanity, I want to state clearly that I don't see North Korea's actions as illogical.)

Based on this assumption, additional conclusions can be drawn. For example, North Korea does not want outright war on the peninsula without the assurance of China's full support. It recognizes that it would be destroyed without China's support and China is not making any promises. North Korea also wants help any way it can get it. Beneficial trade agreements, aid, etc. Finally, North Korea wants to be one of the big boys with the attendant military capabilities and technology savvy to show for it. It is in the crucible of these three basic interests that North Korea's international actions can be understood.

Happily, the same Aristotelian assumption can be applied to China. (Dare we go so far to assume an Aristotelian framework for all states? Only as far as the individual Aristotelian priorities of it's leaders don't come into conflict, creating illogical state behavior says I! But that's another idea for another time.) Therefore, China also wants to become a more dominant player in international relations and wants to continue to prosper domestically. As with North Korea, China's international actions become immediately understandable when viewed in relation to the basic priorities.

NORTH KOREA EXPLAINED:

While North Korea doesn't want outright war, it does want beneficial trade agreements and aid. North Korea views the riders attached to the existing offers of trade and aid as ultimately detrimental to the country. North Korea knows it is weak and suspects that the restrictions that come with the aid and agreements will hasten its collapse. Put more simply, aid is less important than sovereignty.

But god damn it needs those agreements! Dear land it needs that aid! Maybe not as much as it needs a stick big enough to deter those would would steamroll it if China ever withdrew its support, but a few million dollars worth of food would go a long way. So when the US says it won't sit down at the negotiating table until the nuclear program is halted, North Korea rattles its sabre like a child clamoring for attention.

As reprehensible as this sabre rattling may be, one can't ignore the strategy behind the actions. Big, headline-grabbing actions that are, nonetheless, just below the threshold for open war. With the shelling of Yeongpyeong, North Korea indicated that it was not to be ignored. However, its troop positions indicated that it was not preparing for total war. (Claims to minute-man-caliber readiness notwithstanding.) These twin messages managed to straddle the line between attention-getting violence and outright war. And with the intimidating presence of China backing them up, it seems that North Korea can get away with it.

CHINA EXPLAINED:

But why is China playing this role in the first place? Cold War-era understandings of an international fraternity of Communists don't help anyone understand anything at all so let's look closer. If China wasn't involved, what would happen? I daresay the United States and South Korea would have steamrolled Pyongyang years ago. China first helped North Korea push back to the 38th parallel back in the Korean War in order to limit US influence in the region and this basic strategy has persisted for the past 60 years.

If China doesn't throw it's hat in the ring with North Korea, the peninsula goes up in flames and is replaced by a stronger US presence. If China shows any signs of pulling its support, it fears the same result. We should also remember that open war would destabilize the Asian (nay, global) economy, produce a glut of refugees, and, potentially, turn part or all of the peninsula into a radioactive wasteland.

China is trying to prevent open war by limiting the US-South Korean military options through its very presence. China is the North Korean equivalent of the US 'trip-wire' presence that has protected South Korea for the past 60 years. The two superpowers are basically nuclear weapons providing the threat of M.A.D. (more or less...at least enough mutually assured destruction to prevent escalation) to keep the truce.

TRICKINESS:

However, unlike a lifeless hunk of missile that will do your bidding at the touch of a button (assuming your engineers carried their 1's correctly), China needs to be given diplomatic outs. And this is where North Korea's aggression gets more strategic. It needs to rattle its sabre enough to be noticed, not enough to make South Korean and US forces declare war, AND it needs to give China at least a little space in their preferred neutral ground. China needs to be able to (somewhat) legitimately claim that both sides are responsible. 'Yeah, he might have slapped you but you were running your mouth. Both of you calm down.' or 'Yeah, he might have slapped you but I didn't see it and I don't trust the multi-national team of detectives that agree that's what happened.' China needs wiggle room or the whole game is up.

CONCLUSION:

So...what? Good work on your strategy North Korea? Hardly. In case you haven't noticed, you're rattling your sabre a little too hard. The resolve of the US and South Korean leaders is hardening. You're pissing people off now and, while their logical reaction might be to go back to the negotiating table and get you some food for the winter at least, it looks like they're not behaving very logically. Sending a carrier to conduct joint-military exercises off North Korea's coast after Pyonyang's explicit warnings not to do so suggests frustration rather than strategy.

And this is the cool part. As the diplomatic tune shifts further, China will notice it. And China will realize it's getting closer to being forced into a very difficult position. Will it go toe-to-toe with the US in its own backyard? China might well be soon forced to choose between a more prominent US presence or an all-out war. If the US plays its cards right, it can show China that it has more to gain by working together to peacefully dismantle North Korea than watching a bloody war that would surely end with a stronger, nuclear-armed US ally at China's border.

In conclusion, the US and South Korea should continue with their joint-military operations and aggressive posturing but this message needs to be coupled with an extremely honest meeting with Chinese leadership. China needs to understand that the patience is hemorrhaging fast with this latest attack and that it needs to take a harder line on its ally. The US and South Korea should make formal promises for a decreased US presence and no nuclear weapons on a post-reunification Korean peninsula. If these promises can reassure China's security concerns, China should have an easier time accepting that North Korea isn't worth the effort anymore.